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Abstract: 
Starting a decade ago, property crimes by Eastern European crime gangs have gained 
attention of Belgian law enforcement agencies. Due to the mobile nature of these groups, the 
term „itinerant crime groups‟ has been used. The aim of this article is to explore what is 
incorporated in this term. By analyzing 27 case files, a large degree of variation is revealed. 
Groups differ in size, organizational structure, offender characteristics, the crimes in which 
they are involved and the methods they use. Following these features, two main types of 
itinerant crime groups can be distinguished, each with their own diversity. As such, the 
observed heterogeneity is larger than we might suspect by looking at the policy definition of 
the phenomenon. 
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Exploring itinerant crime groups 
Stijn Van Daele & Tom Vander Beken 
 
Itinerant crime groups defined 
Organised property crime and, in particular, so-called itinerant crime groups have received 
considerable attention in Belgium since the start of the twenty-first century.  The phenomenon 
was first observed in the late 1990s by the Belgian police force (De Ruyver, 2006a). On the 
basis of a limited number of case files (Dupuis, 2004), the authorities believed they had 
discovered a new phenomenon.  After half a decade of fine-tuning, the phenomenon was 
defined and recorded in Belgian criminal policy, in the so-called Kadernota Integrale 
Veiligheid (Belgian Ministerial College, 2004) .  Policies concerning these crime groups, and 
how to define their members, were updated by the government in a revised action plan 
(22/03/2007), when “itinerant crime groups” were identified as having the following 
characteristics: 
 an association of criminals; 
 systematically committing residential burglaries or burglaries of commercial 
properties, including ram raids, cargo thefts, metal thefts or thefts of construction 
vehicles and materials; 
 originating mainly from the former Eastern Bloc; 
 operating or directed from abroad or from large conurbations in Belgium; 
 committing a significant number of crimes over a large area; and 
 possibly using minors to commit crimes. 
 
Between 60 and 80 such groups have been identified each year in Belgium since 2004 (De 
Raedt, 2006b).  The size of these groups changes, indicating that their structure is flexible, 
and the organisations have become smaller (De Raedt, 2006b: 41).  An overview of the case 
files reveals a large variety of groups.  Some only comprise around five offenders, while 
others have more than 70 members.  The number of offences committed range from a couple 
of dozens to, exceptionally, more than 1,000 crimes. 
Organised property crime by these groups is raising concerns  not only in Belgium, but also in 
some of its neighbouring countries, under a variety of names.  In the Netherlands, France and 
Germany they are labelled, respectively, “mobile banditism” (Huisman and Van der Laan, 
2005; Van der Laan and Weenink, 2005) “itinerant crime” (Marro, 2002) and “Eastern 
European criminal groups” (Dortans, 2007).  In each of these countries a defining element of 
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these groups is that they systematically commit property offences.  However, other non-
criminal characteristics have also been identified. 
The first is their nationality. The groups that fall under this definition are of Eastern European 
origin. This creates the risk of targeting these groups  disproportionately and, therefore, the 
definition is linked to a sensitive debate, namely that of ethnicity and crime. The second is a 
high degree of mobility; this is often reflected in the terms used to describe them, and it is 
widely accepted that these groups travel long distances to commit their crimes.  While for 
some groups such itinerancy is a way of life, others may travel because they function as what 
Canter called “criminal commuters” (Canter and Larkin, 1993).  Yet, linking itinerancy with 
criminality is controversial as well, because people with higher mobility tend already to suffer 
from the preconception  that they are criminals (James, 2007). Both features – mobility and 
nationality – are encountered in law enforcement perception, but also in empirical data (Van 
Daele, 2008; Van Daele et al., 2008). 
 
Case file diversity 
A first question arising when starting our analysis was to determine which case files were 
suitable. Participation in itinerant crime groups is not considered a qualified crime in 
Belgium. One cannot be punished more severely when being part of such a group. The result 
is that enforcement agencies try to charge these groups with being criminal organisations. 
However, because these organisations receive particular attention within law enforcement 
agencies, studying only those defined as criminal organisations would cause a loss of 
information. We therefore opted for another approach. Contacts were made with judicial 
police forces in five districts with various features: geographic location, size, degrees of 
urbanisation and whether the district mainly functions as target area or more as a starting 
point. We explained the focus of our research and asked for a variation in the case files, after 
which the persons involved supplied us with a number of case files, which they considered as 
interesting for our research.  
The result is a data set of 27 case files of so-called “itinerant crime groups”. Because the 
focus in case selection was put on variation and not on representativeness, only qualitative 
conclusions can be drawn and we will not make quantitative statements. However, even 
without the possibility to quantify the results, relevant information can be provided. One 
should not forget that the phenomenon is quite new and, except for a couple of valuable police 
studies (see for example De Cock, 2007; De Ruyver, 2006b; Dupuis, 2004; Huisman and Van 
4 
der Laan, 2005; Paulussen, 2007; Stichting Maatschappij Veiligheid en Politie, 2006; Van der 
Laan and Weenink, 2005) academic interest for the phenomenon is new and rather limited 
(see Ponsaers, 2004; Van Daele, 2008; Van Daele et al., 2008 for some existing papers). 
 
Levels of organisation and structure 
Due to the selection mechanism used in our analysis, a large variety of crime groups is 
captured. One of the issues in which this is easily observed is the organisational structure of 
these groups. The Belgian annual report on organised crime (Dienst voor het Strafrechtelijk 
Beleid, 2005: 32-34, 2007: 62-64) distinguished four levels of organisation, ranging from 
highly structured and internationally active to opportunistic, temporary active groups. The 
highly organised groups can be dealt with as criminal organisations, but for the small groups, 
this is less likely. Our analysis found both highly structured as barely structured groups, 
including those in between.  
At one extreme, we studied a highly structured organisation of Georgian origin. The group 
was known mainly for the organisation of vehicle thefts and contained various organisational 
levels. There was a leader, residing in Belgium and living in great luxury. He had some 
people he trusted and worked closely together with. Other people were situated a bit lower in 
the hierarchy: couriers, a forger and several people involved in the maintenance of the 
“obchak” – a word used to describe the system of social and financial security within Russian-
like criminal organisations (Lyman and Potter, 1997). At the lowest level were the 
executioners of the crimes. They had a much less luxurious lifestyle and were sometimes 
„transferred‟ from this gang to other gangs abroad. 
At the other extreme, we found a group, coming over to Belgium for a short period. Offenders 
stayed with a Belgian couple and operated in small groups. There was no real structure or 
leadership and the offenders lived in poor circumstances. 
Structural features of most groups are situated somewhere between the two cases described 
above. However, we chose not to further divide into categories. Structural features are to be 
viewed as a continuum: we established the two extremes and observed various types in 
between. Therefore, any further division would be artificial and influenced by personal choice 
and interpretation. Moreover, defining the structural typology of a group is not always 
straightforward. Depending on the attention paid by investigating officers, groups can seem to 
be much more or less structured. We encountered one group which was loosely structured 
according to the case file and our police contact. However, other features such as violence, 
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number of offences and group size resemble that of more structured groups. Instead of further 
dividing the groups, we see more added value in linking group structure to other features like 
offender characteristics, crime types, mobility, strategies and the criminal fence.  
Group sizes differ as well. Group size is not always linked to organisational levels. Of course, 
highly structured groups will have more than two or three offenders. In general, hierarchically 
structured groups are larger. Yet, some groups consist of several offenders – 15 for example – 
outside a clearly defined structure. In these cases, opportunistic and temporary cooperation 
leads to more offenders being involved. 
 
Offender characteristics 
The vast majority of offenders are men. They are involved in criminal operations and in case 
of hierarchy, men have the highest functions. This does not mean that no women are involved. 
In about half of the groups studied, some women play a role within the organization as well. 
Most of them are partners of one of the male offenders. They are active in supporting 
activities like providing accommodation, logistic support and sometimes even fencing. It is 
not always clear to what extent their contributions are essential to the group activities. When 
residing with their respective partners, it is not astonishing that their cell phone numbers are 
encountered during the investigation. Thus, their activities, be it essential or not, are likely to 
be revealed as well. Despite the generally limited involvement of women, two cases reveal 
otherwise. In these two cases, women are active in the group‟s criminal operations and not 
only provide support. 
Most offenders are rather young or middle-aged. Several groups contain offenders born in the 
1950s or even the 1940s. A slightly larger proportion is born in the 1960s. The vast majority 
of nearly all offender groups are perpetrators born in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. 
Most offenders are in their twenties or thirties. Several groups contain older offenders as well. 
Most offenders are experienced too. They often have a criminal record, either in their home 
country, Belgium or even a third country. The crimes they have been known for mostly 
include property crimes, but also violence – whether or not while committing property crimes 
– fraud, forgery and sometimes even drug crimes. While most offenders are adults and often 
experienced, this is not always the case. Two groups use minors for criminal purposes. 
Remarkable is the fact that these are the same groups involving women for crime and not only 
for supporting activities. They each comprise several families and within these families, crime 
is a common activity, not only committed by men, but also by other family members such as 
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women and children, so it appears. This does not mean that the methods are the same: women 
and children mostly commit their crimes by using deception or tricks. They sometimes try to 
gain access to target premises by pretending to sell certain items. Other methods include 
ringing the doorbell to see whether there is any presence. If someone opens the door, they ask 
for simple things – the road to a nearby village for example – and if not, they burgle the 
house. 
As mentioned, some groups consist of family members, which immediately explains their 
origin and the relationship between the offenders. Yet, this does not mean that all offenders 
within these groups are family. There are mostly a number of families, surrounded by other 
individuals. This results in a mix between families and other. We believe it is therefore better 
to speak of clan-wise structure instead of family structure. This clan structure is observed in 
most gypsy groups. Some of them have come to Western Europe more recently, while others 
have stayed here for longer periods and have mixed with indigenous groups. While the first 
are active throughout the country, the latter are mostly active in the border regions. 
Not all groups are characterized by a clan structure. Within some groups, the members 
mention no previous relationship at all. Their cases show no evidence of other relationships 
than having come to Belgium separately, in search for a better life, and having met each other 
by coincidence. In search for work, they made contact with people in the same situation and 
in this way, got involved into crime. Yet, this is not the case for all groups. In several cases, 
offenders originated from the same region or even the same town. Although it is not always 
explicitly mentioned in the files – being no investigation priority – it is quite likely that they 
have known each other beforehand.  
Members of other groups seem to have no known personal relationship, but are accepted in a 
certain group because they are part of the broader structure within which the group operates. 
This is particularly observed in highly structured groups.  
A final offender characteristic is nationality. It is often mentioned that these groups are from 
Eastern European origin. That does not mean that only Eastern European offenders 
systematically commit property crimes. Some groups contain a mix of nationalities, within or 
outside Eastern Europe. It mostly occurred that there is one dominant nationality, surrounded 
and supported by several figures of other nationalities. The encountered main nationalities are 
Rumanian – with or without Moldovan – and former Yugoslavian (each 8 cases), Albanian 
and Georgian (each 3 cases) and Polish (1 case). Some districts consider other nationalities as 
well. Two groups are mainly French, one group Dutch and one Belgian. Border district police 
forces have observed groups with similar methods but not of Eastern European origin. Thus, 
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they do not consider Eastern European nationality as necessary condition for itinerant crime 
groups. Several groups have no homogenous composition. Surrounding people have 
nationalities ranging from all sorts of Eastern European nationalities (those already mentioned 
above, but also offenders originating from Ukraine, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Russia, Czech 
Republic, Belarus) to Western European offenders (French, Dutch, Belgian and naturalized 
Belgian) and even Southern European (Italian) and Northern African (Moroccan) offenders. 
Observing only offender features, it already appears that “itinerant crime group” is a 
heterogeneous concept. The majority of offenders are men, young adults or middle-aged, of 
Eastern European nationalities. However, they are supported by older offenders, women and 
offenders from other nationalities. In some cases, other offenders‟ activities extend support: in 
some gypsy groups, women play an active role in criminal behaviour, and so do even 
children. In other groups, involved in border region crime, Eastern European nationalities are 
not as dominant as elsewhere. 
 
Crime types 
Itinerant crime groups are mainly active in the area of property crimes. The number of 
offences ranges from 4 to more than 400. These are only estimates, as it is not always possible 
to prove the involvement of a group into a certain crime. Therefore, enforcement authorities 
sometimes choose to focus more on investigating and proving a rather limited number of 
crimes than bringing all highly likely group activities in picture. There is no clear correlation 
between the number of crimes committed and the duration of activity: some groups have been 
active for more than two years and have „only‟ committed about 80 property crimes, others 
have succeeded in committing probably up to 400 crimes just in eight months, of which they 
were really active for less than 5. There is some link between group structure and number of 
crimes. Yet, this should not be overrated. Well-structured groups particularly choosing their 
targets and specialized in certain crimes will very likely commit less crimes than small groups 
committing random burglaries. 
Home burglaries and car thefts occur most often and are committed by almost any group. 
Other crimes are committed by some groups. An alternative to car thefts is stealing anything 
inside the vehicle: electronic devices but also work material that is locked in vans. 
Commercial burglaries require more knowledge and are committed less often. Nevertheless, a 
couple of groups is specialized in it, but they mostly commit less crimes within a certain 
period. The same counts for metal thefts and thefts of documents: it is no activity in which 
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most groups engage, but the domain of a few groups. Even more specialization is required for 
skimming. Thus, the latter has only been observed in a minority of groups. 
Ram raiding is the final property crime type encountered in our case file analysis. Although 
few groups tend to commit a limited amount of ram raids, two groups make it their main 
criminal activity. Both of them belong to the “border region crime” type described above: the 
offenders are not illegally residing Eastern Europeans, but Western European, operating at 
both sides of the border. 
It is typical for these groups that they are active in the area of „ordinary‟ property crimes. 
However, one police officers told us that this had more to do with the police structure in 
Belgium – each police department being divided according crime types they investigate – than 
with the activities of these groups. Because the cases were provided by the property crime 
departments of the police, we had only limited information on other crimes than property 
offences. Yet, there was often information on other crimes these groups were involved in. We 
did not consider criminal fence as a separate crime type, because it is a consequence of 
committed property crimes. Still, ten case files dealt with multi-criminal groups. This does not 
mean that the rest is not involved in other crimes than property offences. It only means that 
there was no such information obtained from the case file. 
Five groups have been known for forging identification papers. By using fake identity papers, 
offenders succeed in moving more freely into and throughout Europe. In this way, the use of 
false papers is not completely strange. Other crimes have different degrees of seriousness 
ranging from prohibited use of weapons and use of violence (one case each) to severe crimes 
such as manslaughter (three cases) and more internationally oriented crimes like trafficking in 
human beings (one case) and drug trafficking (seven cases). Multi-criminality is linked to 
structural features. Two multi-crime groups have only limited structures. However, their 
multi-criminal behaviour is limited to forgery, prohibited use of weapons and drug-related 
activities. Most groups known for multi-criminal activity, however, are well-structured, have 
international links and/or operate on an international level. 
Itinerant crime groups are known for systematically committing property crimes. These range 
from rather easily approachable examples, such as burglary and car theft, to more specialized 
offences like metal theft, commercial burglary, theft of documents, skimming and ram 
raiding, the latter being mostly committed by border region crime groups. However, the 
criminal repertory of itinerant crime groups does not stop there: particularly the highly 
structured groups are engaged in trafficking in drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, 
prohibited use of weapons and even violence and manslaughter.  
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Mobility 
Itinerant crime groups engage mainly in systematically committing property crimes, but also 
in other aspects of the criminal perspective. True, they are organized, and some are more than 
others, but engagement in property crimes does not make them completely different from 
other criminal gangs or organizations. Spapens and Fijnaut (2005: 82) distinguish four 
offender types in their study on organized burglary. Next to itinerant crime groups – or mobile 
gangs – as they call them, professional thieves may also operate in groups and/or work in 
organized structures. The same counts for car theft and smuggling of stolen vehicles, another 
example of property crimes executed by criminal groups (Bruinsma and Bernasco, 2004: 86; 
Spapens and Fijnaut, 2005: 98). Then what is it that makes these itinerant crime groups this 
special? Although choice of words varies to describe these groups, mobility is a recurrent 
issue. Question hereby, however, is how to understand this mobility. Is it a part of their 
lifestyle, are they travellers? In that case, one should avoid to generalize, as these people have 
to deal with presumptions as being criminal already (James, 2007). Or are they just mobile in 
their criminal behaviour, travelling further when committing crimes but not travelling as a 
way of life at all? The latter would mean they conflict with reigning criminological theories 
such as distance decay theory (see for example Rattner and Portnov, 2007; Rengert et al., 
1999; Van Koppen and De Keijser, 1997). Ponsaers (2004) opted for the first option, stating 
that criminal behaviour of these groups challenges distance decay theory mainly because 
these offenders have no fixed residences, making it hard to assess their offending patterns. 
Our case file analysis showed that most offenders stay in Belgium illegally and only for rather 
short periods. This seems to confirm the travelling lifestyle hypothesis. However, looking at 
the individual offender is too limited and group offending cannot be explained by making the 
sum of all perpetrators individually (Tillyer and Kennedy, 2008: 81). From a group point of 
view, itinerant lifestyles account for only a part of these groups. Journey-to-crime of offender 
groups may cause problems, because distance should be measured from two points and 
mostly, operations will be located nearby the anchor point of one of the offenders (Bernasco, 
2006: 147). For our subject groups, this is mostly no problem, as the starting point for one 
offender is the same or very nearby as for the others. In rare cases where more than one 
starting point was encountered, police investigations managed to clearly distinguish the 
relevant starting point. 
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Study of the anchor points of itinerant crime groups learns us two things. From a theoretical 
perspective, larger travelled distances cannot be attributed to wrong registration of the anchor 
points. These offenders are mobile after all, particularly in their criminal behaviour. 
Therefore, there is a need for further analysis to explain this high level of mobility. From a 
practical perspective, crime trips and starting points thereof can be assessed. This is quite 
important, as it creates opportunities to investigate and capture the totality of a group, not only 
the people committing the crimes, but other actors being involved as well. Crime trips often 
started in similar, so-called vulnerable, neighbourhoods and sometimes even the same 
temporary residences returned. One of the contacted police officers mentioned this as being 
quite common, particularly in cases where third parties provide these residences. 
 
Criminal fence 
Itinerant crime groups travel large distances when committing crimes and this cannot be 
attributed to lack of fixed residences. Anchor point analysis shows that most groups have one 
or more offenders living in Belgium and/or connections with locally embedded people. This 
does not necessarily mean that all operations occur on a local or national level. In order to 
further assess mobility patterns, the relationships and fencing networks have been studied. 
These are not always investigation priorities and may therefore remain unclear in some cases. 
Nevertheless, some relevant information could be obtained. Lu (2003), in a study on vehicle 
theft, found that mobility patterns after crimes may as well reflect distance decay and be 
rather similar to traditional journey-to-crime patterns. The criminal fence can be an important 
factor in crime, because the relationship between the criminal receiver and the thief is 
essential for both parties. Nevertheless, attention for the criminal fence is rather limited. 
Sutton (1998) distinguishes five types of fencing markets, ranging from commercial sales to 
hawking i.e. directly selling to consumers in clubs, pubs,…  
Studies showed criminal receivers not always being professional receivers/criminals (Kruize, 
2007: 53-56) and fencing often occurring through informal ways (Kleemans, 1996: 71). 
Concerning the itinerant crime groups, some professional receivers were pictured. One case 
involved a fence dealing with expensive jewellery. In some other cases the fence took place in 
one or more pawnshops and for metal thefts, stolen goods are often sold to scrap dealers. This 
does not mean that these receivers are always aware of the criminal nature of the goods. Yet, 
while some cases involve professional receivers, most fencing activities take place through 
informal networks. These can be situated on a local level or abroad. Local fencing takes place 
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through locally embedded persons or within the informal networks of the group (for example 
gypsy communities). In general, these groups steal easily disposable goods like jewellery, 
money and small electronics. One case involves a group being active in thefts of working 
tools. Buyers were then sought through a number of phone calls. In other cases, goods and 
vehicles were sold on second hand markets. 
Most groups find ways to sell their stolen goods. Nevertheless, alternatives exist. First, some 
groups steal goods they do not have to sell, because they need not be sold. This can be the 
case for money, but also for small amounts of jewellery and small electronics. Typical for 
some of these groups, however, is that they steal consumables: food, drinks, cigarettes,… This 
is often the case for small, loosely structured groups and traveller clans (both Eastern 
European as indigenous). A second alternative is international fencing. A majority of the 
groups in our sample let the people in their home country benefit from their criminal 
behaviour. This includes transporting stolen goods (mostly by car) and stolen vehicles (mostly 
driven, rarely by boat), but also sending money home, often through money transfer 
companies. One should not forget that, although most groups have anchor points in Western 
Europe, the group members change. Thus, their family and sometimes even the centre of their 
own life, may still be situated in their home country. In this way, crime can be seen as an 
investment for a better life, both for them – whether or not they stay here for a longer time – 
and for their family (see also Segaert, 2006: 30). Rarely, criminal earnings are invested in 
further criminal activity. 
Fencing activities for itinerant crime groups vary from own use and local activities through 
international fencing and letting the family benefit from the earnings. This variation offers 
opportunities to find out to what extent groups and group members still have connections with 
their home country and their degree of embedment in local society. 
 
Risk management 
As not all itinerant crime groups have a similar structure or composition, and they are active 
in various domains of property crimes and beyond, it comes as no surprise that methods and 
strategies differ as well. Part of this difference is related to crime type: commercial burglaries 
require more sophisticated ore quicker methods (due to alarms) than most home burglaries, 
cars can be stolen either on the street by force or by stealing the keys inside the house first, 
the latter case being called „garage theft‟, ram raids require cars and some degree of 
violence,… However, other strategies may differ as well. Offenders, just as their possible 
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victims, engage in some form of risk management, trying to maximize their chances of 
success. 
One of these strategies is preparation and planning. This occurs mostly in case of more 
advanced forms of crime and/or specific targets (De Cock, 2006: 47, 2007). After the decision 
to commit burglaries has been taken, there is often little or no further preparation. Bennett and 
Wright (1984: 45-46) called this typology „the search‟. In their sample, nearly half of the 
offenders belong to this type. Other authors observed this typology as well, also in Belgium 
(see Verwee et al., 2007: 104-106). Repeat victimization occurs regularly. Six groups hit the 
same targets during their operations. Another group does not really target the same premises, 
but always targets the same type of vacation houses, with exactly the same arrangement. For 
burglaries, repeat victimization is not a exclusive operation method of these groups. On the 
contrary, re-victimization is quite common (Nee and Meenaghan, 2006: 946). Itinerant crime 
groups follow no totally different preparation scheme than other burglars either. What is 
rather typical, however, is that they often operate in series. 
One possible explanation for this serial behaviour is that they do not fear police action (De 
Cock, 2007). They do fear imprisonment, however, particularly if it were in their home 
country (De Cock, 2006). As a consequence, various risk reducing measures have been 
observed. One often encountered strategy is reconnaissance activity, noticed in 18 out of 27 
case files. The extent of reconnaissance varies. Most of them were performed shortly – one or 
a couple of days – before the crimes. Concerning residential burglaries, reconnaissance was, if 
present, often limited to a rather short exploration of the area, sometimes even by other people 
than those burgling. For commercial burglaries, this was more systematic: more information 
was obtained and targets were picked more carefully. One group had inside information on 
their targets and another had a map with all companies of their target type in Belgium and 
France. 
Using strategies such as repeat victimization, planning, reconnaissance and mapping, these 
offender groups become familiar with their target areas and become aware of the features of 
their region of operation. Brantingham and Brantingham (1981) defined the awareness space 
as the area of which offenders have knowledge. The gaining of this knowledge is based on 
both criminal and innocent activities (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981: 35). „Innocent‟ 
activities can include work, school, shopping and leisure. Despite some exceptions, no 
information on „innocent creation of awareness space‟ is known for these groups. Repeat 
victimization may be an explanation for further criminal activity, but it does not explain the 
initial criminal behaviour within a certain region.  Because crime trips into unknown 
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territories are relatively rare (Palmer et al., 2002: 12; Van der Kemp and Van Koppen, 2007: 
353), further research on the awareness space of these criminals is needed. 
Next to the creation of awareness space and increasing knowledge on the target area, other 
risk management measures are encountered as well. Most groups use what we may call 
„silent‟ strategies to avoid arrests: they reduce traceability by using phone cells, regularly 
changing SIM-cards and cell phones, use codes in conversation, use false identities and ID 
papers, destroy evidence, only commit crimes when the residents are absent (this is not new - 
see also Bennett and Wright, 1984: 94; Kleemans, 1996: 53-54), minimize telephone contacts 
during the crimes, flee or temporarily stop criminal activity when they scent danger, use the 
way of least resistance and mislead potential victims. Violence towards victims is often not 
used or only to a limited extent, while internal violence is slightly more common. However, 
not all of them apply only silent/discrete strategies to reduce risks. One group committed one 
burglary in advance, in order to find out how long it would take the police authorities to 
arrive. Other groups block to road for police cars, act blatant in their criminal operations and 
threaten with or use violence against victims and/or police when pursued. 
 
Towards a typology of itinerant crime groups 
Various features have been attributed to itinerant crime groups. A qualitative case file analysis 
revealed a lot of variation, in organizational level, but also in offender characteristics, crime 
type, mobility, the criminal fence and risk management. In general, two main group types can 
be distinguished. On the one hand, we find the gypsy type groups, on the other the crime 
gangs. For each type, two extremes have been noticed. Thus, 4 extremes are observed, each 
with their own particular features (see table 1). Although we have divided the itinerant crime 
groups into two main group types, this does not mean that there can be no mixed groups at all, 
but most of them will incline towards one or the other. 
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Table 1: Typology of Itinerant Crime Groups 
“Itinerant Crime Groups” 
Criminal Communities: 
Clan wise structure 
Crime Gangs: 
Working together 
Ranging from: to: Ranging from: to: 
Border region groups 
Flexible gypsy 
groups 
Fortune-hunters Professional groups 
 
The first main type can best be describes as criminal communities. They have a clan wise 
structure and are characterized by a number of kinship relations: one or several families live 
together and know of each other‟s activities. They often form a part of the gypsy community, 
but it is important not to put them all in the same box: observed criminal activities should not 
lead to stigmatization of the whole gypsy community. Two subtypes have been noticed, each 
with their own specialization. 
At the one extreme of the criminal communities we found the border region crime groups: 
small clans staying mostly in trailer camps in the border regions. These groups stay mostly 
within the same region. They are active in various types of property crimes, particularly 
including vehicle thefts and ram raids at both sides of the border. Their targets have often 
been repeatedly victimized and they make few efforts to stay unnoticed. When confronted 
with police, they flee, create distractions and try to eliminate their traces, for example by 
leaving/burning their cars and blocking the road for police vehicles. 
At the other extreme, we found flexible gypsy groups. Some members stay within the same 
region, be it in trailer camps or in houses. These groups have international connections with 
other clans. This is observed in group membership (members being connected to several 
groups in various countries) and fencing activities (international fencing, making it difficult to 
trace the nature of certain goods). Flexibility is also observed in criminal behaviour: some of 
the groups are multi-criminal in a way that they do not only commit property crimes. Yet, 
there is more flexibility than this: whereas in other group types, crimes are almost exclusively 
committed by adult men, this is not the case here. Children and women are also sent out for 
stealing. Typical is that they avoid conflict, both with victims and with other actors such as 
witnesses or police. In order to do so, they use tricks and deception to gain access to houses 
and to rob people. Although cases are known of internal violence and conflicts, this is mostly 
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not translated into violence towards victims, another example of their conflict-evading 
behaviour. 
The second main type consists of crime gangs, not crime clans. Although some relatives may 
be encountered within a group, this is rather exceptional. These group members organize 
themselves not as a part of their lifestyle, but as part of their criminal behaviour. The reason 
for these groups to exist lies within their criminal actions. Again, two subtypes are observed, 
but here there is more of a continuum. The gypsy groups were both characterized by their own 
way of specialization. Within the crime gangs however, one type is clearly characterized by 
higher levels of organization, professionalism and specialization than the other. 
At the low extreme we find groups of fortune-hunters. They have come over to Western 
Europe to create a better life back home. Some of them even did not know where to stay when 
they started their trip, some of them had a connection with someone here who was to provide 
temporary residences. They are loosely structured and, although they may have a criminal 
record back home, they are not specialized in particular crime types. Typical for this group 
type is the involvement in burglaries and car thefts, crimes for which only limited skills are 
required. From the group perspective, we often observe fixed anchor points in Belgium. From 
the perspective of the individual offender, however, temporariness is the key concept. 
Offenders of this fortune-hunter group type come over for short periods, regularly together 
with people they know, and return to their home country afterwards. They do not try to build 
up a life in Western Europe. This is reflected in the criminal earnings, which are transported 
to their home country. Relations with their homeland are vital and in several case files, 
offenders called their relatives using the phone in the house they burgled. Thus, there is an 
international perspective linked to these groups, but it is mostly bilateral: only the country of 
origin and the country they operate are involved. This, amongst other things, distinguishes 
them from the second type of crime gangs. 
At the high end, we encounter highly professional and skilled groups. They engage in all sorts 
of criminal behaviour. Next to property crimes, links have been found with drugs smuggling, 
trafficking in human beings, violence,… the heart of the structure lies not in the country of 
origin but in Western Europe. These groups have international connections as well. However, 
the connections here are multilateral and also linked to other Western European countries. 
Group members are changing, not because they return back home but because they are 
transferred to other groups. The Western European focus of these groups is also translated in 
the criminal fence. Goods are more likely to be sold in the West or transported via detours to 
the East, there is more investment in other criminal activities and items such as real estate, art 
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and luxury goods. The reason they are brought under the heading “itinerant crime groups” is 
mainly because of their Eastern European origin, not because of their itinerant/flexible 
behaviour. 
 
Back to the definition 
The Belgian definition of itinerant crime groups mentions a number of relevant issues to 
distinguish these groups. They are groups, originating mainly from the Eastern Bloc and 
committing a variation of property crimes. Other important aspects are their mobility, the fact 
that they operate from abroad or from the large Belgian conurbations, and the possible use of 
minors. As the police forces indicate themselves (De Raedt, 2006a: 23), this definition is 
based on empirical observations starting from the 1990s. Our case file analysis reveals that a 
high degree of variation is captured under the notion of “itinerant crime groups”. Four main 
group types of itinerant crime groups have been observed. Linking the definition to the group 
types we encountered in our case file analysis, a number of questions are raised. 
First, although border region crime groups are considered itinerant crime groups, one can ask 
whether this is truly the case. They are groups and are involved in property crimes. However, 
their operations are mainly limited to the border regions and as such, they are less mobile than 
the other types. They are also often Dutch or French instead of Eastern European. As mobility 
and nationality appear to be two important issues in the definition, one could wonder whether 
these border region crime clans are indeed itinerant crime groups. 
Second, the definition mentions the possible use of minors. However, this has only been 
encountered in one type of groups. Although this aspect can be interesting to study, it is not a 
generally encountered feature of these groups. Therefore, including it in the definition may be 
confusing rather than clarifying. 
Third, most groups – and certainly the large ones – are charged with being criminal 
organisations, and one could wonder whether there is an added value in another definition. 
Moreover, the emphasis in other countries is not always the same. In Germany (see for 
example Dortans, 2007), mobility is not really considered a determining issue, while in the 
Netherlands, the use of hit-and-run techniques is mentioned (Van der Laan and Weenink, 
2005: 13), indicating short-term mobility and a very short stay in the target country – days 
instead of months. Thus, the phenomenon is addressed differently in the countries where it is 
observed, making comparisons and law enforcement cooperation more difficult. 
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Conclusion 
Itinerant crime groups have increasingly gained attention by police forces in Western Europe, 
in this case Belgium. Policy makers have tried to put the phenomenon of Eastern European 
criminal gangs committing property crimes in a definition, but the scope of this definition is 
rather broad and not exhaustive, so it appears. A case file analysis of 27 groups shows large 
degrees of variation. There is heterogeneity in levels of organization, but also in offender 
characteristics, crime types, fencing, risk management and not to the least extent mobility. 
Because of these variations a further division into subtypes seemed appropriate. Criminal 
communities cannot be easily compared with Eastern European crime gangs and even within 
each type, the case files reveal large degrees of heterogeneity. There is one term used to 
describe these offender groups: “itinerant crime groups”. However, our case file analysis 
shows that „groups‟ are herewith interpreted in various ways, ranging from flexible, loosely 
structured to highly professional, „crime‟ can be more than just property crimes and „itinerant‟ 
is by no means straightforward, as many groups have fixed bases or even residences in 
Western Europe. 
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